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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In this dissertation I examine how reported earnings performance influences 
firms’ decisions to provide disclosure about their research and development (R&D) 
activities in their 10-K reports. Understanding firms’ disclosure decisions is a 
fundamental issue in the accounting literature.1 In particular, the role of firm performance 
in disclosure decisions has received considerable attention from academic researchers as 
well as from external stakeholders and regulators.2 A large body of this literature 
suggests that the likelihood that firms’ voluntarily disclose a specific set of information is 
increasing in the performance news it contains (Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1985). However, 
mandatory financial disclosures such as earnings also report performance news to 
investors and it is not well understood how the news (i.e., good vs. bad news) 
communicated in these disclosures influences firms’ decisions to voluntarily provide 
additional disclosure information such as R&D disclosure or to provide different types of 
disclosures such as quantitative or qualitative disclosures.3 
                                                          
1 In fact, Verrecchia (1990) states that understanding managerial incentives to disclose information is “the 
quintessential accounting problem.” 
2 Examples of analytical work include Grossman and Hart (1980), Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), 
Verrecchia (1983), Dye (1985), and Jung and Kwon (1988). 
3 For example, Einhorn (2005) predicts that firms’ are equally likely to provide voluntary disclosures, 
regardless of whether mandatory disclosures are favorable or unfavorable, while Bagnoli and Watts (2007) 
predict that the likelihood of voluntary disclosure depends on the absolute magnitude of the news in the 
mandatory reports. Under certain assumptions it can be shown that the likelihood of disclosure could vary 
negatively or positively with the news in mandatory reports (Duvall 1967; Baiman and Demski 1980; 
Hughes and Pae 2004). In addition, none of these models consider the difference between quantitative and 
qualitative disclosure types.  
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 Prior empirical research typically focuses on how performance influences the 
disclosure of quantitative financial information that directly summarizes financial 
performance (e.g., earnings, earnings guidance, or accounting segment data).4 However, a 
comparatively large amount of disclosure information such as R&D disclosure is more 
qualitative in nature (i.e., presented in narrative form) and is not directly incorporated in 
the financial statements. Prior research focuses less on this type of disclosure, perhaps 
because it is difficult to measure and quantify. Nonetheless, qualitative disclosure is 
important because it helps market participants bridge the gap between the financial 
statements and the economic reality of firms’ operations (Glassman 2003).  
Recent empirical studies find that the textual characteristics (e.g., readability and 
tone) of qualitative disclosures have information content beyond that contained in 
quantitative accounting disclosures and are associated with important economic 
consequences such as equity mispricing and the characteristics of firms’ information 
environments (Davis et al. 2008; Li 2008, 2010; Feldman et al. 2009; Brown and Tucker 
2010; Lehavy, Li, and Merkley 2010). But less is known about the determinants of firms’ 
decisions to provide specific types of qualitative disclosure content and, importantly, 
whether the role of reported performance on these disclosures differs from more 
quantitative disclosures. To address these limitations, I examine the relation between 
reported earnings performance and qualitative disclosure in the context of R&D-related 
disclosures and contrast this relation with that of earnings guidance decisions.  
The R&D setting, in particular, offers several features that highlight the value of 
qualitative supplementary disclosure to market participants. First, prior research suggests 
                                                          
4 For examples, see Patell (1976), Penman (1980), Ajinkya and Gift (1984), Lev and Penman (1990), 
Skinner (1994), Kasznik and Lev (1995), Harris (1998), Healy and Palepu (2001), Botoson and Stanford 
(2005), and Berger and Hann (2007). 
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that financial statements do not communicate effectively the value of R&D investments, 
especially when financial performance is low (Hayn 1995; Lev 1999; Lev and Zarowin 
1999; Franzen et al. 2007). In this case, information about firms’ R&D activities can play 
an important role by helping investors assess the nature and causes of lower financial 
performance and improve their understanding of the fundamentals of firms’ operations 
(Joos and Plesko 2005). Second, R&D investments are associated with significantly high 
levels of risk and information asymmetry with respect to their potential outcomes 
(Aboody and Lev 2000). Disclosure that helps investors assess these outcomes is 
especially important because R&D has a significant impact on firm value and economic 
growth.5 The combination of investors’ need for R&D-related information and the 
limitations of financial statements to convey it provides managers an important disclosure 
opportunity. They can provide supplemental R&D disclosure to improve investors’ 
understanding of firms’ fundamental business activities as well as their assessment of 
firms’ future prospects.  
To identify R&D-related disclosures, I construct a measure based on the number 
of R&D-related sentences provided in 10-K filings. I categorize a sentence as R&D-
related if it contains specific R&D-related keywords or phrases (see Appendix A). To 
identify the content of R&D-related disclosures, I classify R&D-related sentences into 
subjects, such as progress, competition, and facilities, based on the words provided in 
each sentence (see Appendix B for examples).6 Using a sample of 20,990 10-K filings of 
                                                          
5 See Griliches (1981, 1998), Jaffe (1986), Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988), Hall (1993), Aghion and 
Tirole (1994), Sougiannis (1994), Lev and Sougiannis (1996), Chan et al. (2001), and Lev (2001).  
6 I use 10-K disclosures to measure firms’ qualitative R&D-related disclosures because they are provided 
concurrently with the audited financial statements. However, the main inferences of this study continue to 
hold using the number of R&D-related press releases for a reduced sample of R&D intensive firms (see 
Appendix C for results). In addition, in Section 4.5 I show that my measure differs from total 10-K length 
with respect to its association with absolute stock returns and relative bid-ask spreads.  
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firms that invest in R&D from 1996-2007, I find that firms disclose, on average, about 31 
R&D-related sentences per 10-K. 
My first hypothesis considers how changes in reported earnings performance 
explain firms’ R&D disclosure behavior. On the one hand, as earnings performance 
decreases, reported earnings becomes less predictive of future performance, i.e., the 
earnings signal becomes noisier (Hayn 1995; Joos and Plesko 2005). In addition, the 
information asymmetry between insiders and external investors increases (Wittenberg-
Moerman 2008; Brown et al. 2009; Ng et al. 2009; Rogers et al. 2009). Thus, as earnings 
performance decreases the investors of firms that invest in R&D activities demand more 
information about those activities to better assess the amount and uncertainty of future 
cash flows. On the other hand, as earnings performance increases the predictive power of 
reported earnings increases and information asymmetry decreases, but the costs of 
disclosure potentially increase because better reported performance invites the attention 
of competitors (e.g., proprietary costs). Thus, I predict that current earnings performance 
is negatively related to the amount of firms’ R&D-related disclosure.   
Consistent with this prediction, I find that firms reporting lower (higher) earnings 
performance, measured by operating earnings divided by assets, provide more (less) 
R&D-related disclosure. This relation holds in analyses employing both firm-fixed effect 
and changes methodologies after controlling for a variety of disclosure determinants such 
as information environment, type of operations, uncertainty, and financing-related 
incentives. The result also holds for samples of firms with both increasing and decreasing 
earnings performance and using alternative measures of performance such as the 
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market’s valuation of R&D investments, operating cash flow, and whether the firm met 
analysts’ expectations.  
To better understand the factors underlying this relation, I further investigate the 
role of earnings performance on R&D-related disclosure by examining when the relation 
between year-to-year changes earnings performance and changes in R&D-related 
disclosure is most pronounced. First, I predict a stronger negative relation between 
changes in earnings performance and changes in R&D-related disclosure for firms that 
place more importance on R&D investments. I measure the importance that firms place 
on R&D using the intensity of R&D investments and the level of industry competition. I 
posit that investors in these firms have greater interest in R&D information as reported 
performance decreases and, thus, firms have stronger incentives to provide R&D-related 
disclosure. My findings are consistent with this prediction.  
I also predict that the relation between changes in earnings performance and 
changes in R&D-related disclosure is more negative for firms with higher outside 
monitoring in the form of financial analysts and institutional shareholders because these 
market participants have greater influence and access to management and can pressure 
firms to increase disclosure when performance is poor (Matsumoto et al. 2006). In 
addition, certain institutional shareholders likely demand greater disclosure because they 
hold large positions and bear greater costs to adjust their holdings. Consistent with this 
prediction, I find a significantly stronger negative relation between changes in earnings 
performance and changes in R&D-related disclosure for firms with higher outside 
monitoring. 
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Overall, these results suggest that current earnings performance influences firms’ 
qualitative disclosure decisions. However, qualitative and quantitative disclosures can 
serve different purposes and firms’ disclosure behavior in relation to these disclosures 
and performance could differ. For example, qualitative disclosure can help investors 
better understand firms’ fundamental operations, while quantitative disclosure, such as 
earnings guidance, directly informs investors about performance. Knowing whether 
reported performance influences qualitative and quantitative disclosures differently 
improves our understanding of firms’ overall disclosure strategies. While my main results 
suggest that current earnings performance is negatively associated with R&D-related 
disclosure, I find that R&D firms’ decisions to provide earnings guidance, a more 
quantitative type of disclosure, are positively related to reported performance. These 
findings highlight the complexity of firms’ disclosure strategies and suggest that 
performance can influence different types of disclosures in different ways.7 
In addition to examining the role of performance on firms’ R&D disclosure, I also 
consider the capital market consequences associated with these disclosures. Specifically, 
I find that the 10-K filings of firms with greater levels and absolute changes of R&D 
disclosure contain greater information content as measured by absolute stock returns 
around the 10-K filing date. I also document that higher levels and increases in R&D 
disclosure are associated with decreases in firms’ relative bid-ask spreads following the 
10-K filing, suggesting that R&D disclosures reduce uncertainty. These results are 
consistent with 10-K R&D disclosures containing meaningful information content. 
                                                          
7 I also find that R&D disclosure and earning guidance associate differently with future earnings and 
earnings persistence (see section 4.5 for the results). 
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This dissertation contributes to the disclosure literature in several ways. First, 
prior research focuses largely on how performance influences the disclosure of 
quantitative financial information or the release of a particular type of disclosure.8 In 
contrast, this study addresses management’s decisions to provide qualitative disclosure 
and compares it with firms’ decisions to provide more quantitative disclosures. 
Understanding how performance influences firms’ qualitative disclosure decisions is 
particularly important because of the proportionately large amount of this information 
and its role in informing investors about firms’ activities.  
Second, while many studies control for firms’ disclosure policies using measures 
of management earnings forecasts, the findings of this study suggest that this approach 
could over-generalize firms’ disclosures and that researchers should also consider 
qualitative disclosures when studying or controlling for disclosure. This is particularly 
important because I find that firms’ performance influences some disclosures differently 
and that different types of disclosure have different capital market implications. Finally, 
this study contributes to prior work investigating the textual features (e.g., readability and 
tone) of qualitative disclosures by focusing on firms’ decisions to provide different 
amounts of R&D-related information and by providing a methodology for empirically 
quantifying such disclosures. 
Section 2 reviews prior literature and develops my hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the data and sample, and section 4 presents my empirical results. Section 5 
concludes.
                                                          
8 For example, studies have examined conference calls (Frankel et al. 1999; Tasker 1999; Bowen et al. 
2002), press releases (Miller 2002), and analyst disclosure ratings (Lang and Lundholm 1993). However, 
these studies have generally focused on the existence of specific disclosures or overall disclosure quality, 
rather than managements’ decisions regarding the level of disclosure in a particular content area. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this section, I review the related disclosure and R&D literatures and develop 
hypotheses about the relation between R&D-related disclosure and reported financial 
performance as well as about the determinants of the cross-sectional variation in this 
relation. 
2.1 Forms of Voluntary Disclosure 
 The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations motivates the 
need for managers to disclose relevant information to obtain financing from outside 
investors and to help current investors evaluate managerial actions. To obtain access to 
the public U.S. capital markets, firms must agree to be subject to securities regulations, 
created and enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These 
regulations make the disclosure of certain financial information mandatory, such as 
audited financial statements.9 Nevertheless, firms continue to exercise considerable 
discretion regarding the amount and content of disclosure within their mandatory reports.  
In general, the information firms voluntarily disclose can be classified into two 
forms: 1) direct financial information (frequently quantitative) and 2) qualitative 
disclosure (i.e., narrative information of a more qualitative nature). Prior studies 
sometimes refer to these two forms of information as hard and soft information (Petersen 
2004; Engelberg 2008; Demers and Vega 2010; Minnis 2010). A large body of analytical
                                                          
9 See Schipper [2007] for a discussion of required disclosures in financial reports. 
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and empirical research examines the voluntary disclosure of more direct financial 
information, but less is known about firms’ qualitative disclosures.  
Analytical studies model a firm’s decision to disclose a noisy signal of firm value 
and consider whether the news in the signal exceeds a certain equilibrium threshold. The 
threshold is determined in a rational expectations framework based on either 1) the costs 
of disclosure or 2) investors’ uncertainty about management’s information (Verrecchia 
1983; Dye 1985). An important result from this literature is that the likelihood that a firm 
voluntarily discloses a particular set of information is increasing in the news contained in 
the information.  
However, it is also important to consider the role of mandatory disclosure. SEC 
regulations require that firms provide periodic mandatory disclosures and it is unclear 
from recent theoretical work how the news communicated in these disclosures (i.e., good 
vs. bad news) influences firms’ decisions to provide different types and amounts of 
supplementary disclosures. Einhorn (2005) predicts that firms’ are equally likely to 
provide voluntary disclosures, regardless of whether mandatory disclosures are favorable 
or unfavorable. However, Bagnoli and Watts (2007) predict that the likelihood of 
voluntary disclosure depends on the absolute magnitude of the news in the mandatory 
reports. In addition, under certain assumptions it can be shown that the likelihood of 
disclosure could vary negatively or positively with the news in mandatory reports (Duvall 
1967; Baiman and Demski 1980; Hughes and Pae 2004).  
Given the differences in these analytical findings, the role of performance on 
firms’ supplementary disclosure is an open empirical question. However, the differences 
in the theoretical results suggest that it is important to consider the complexity of firms’ 
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disclosure behavior and the varying incentives of the parties involved (e.g., managers, 
investors, or regulators). For example, while many studies suggest that better performing 
firms provide more disclosure, it is possible that under certain conditions firms will 
produce disclosures only if the reported performance is poor because the costs and 
benefits of additional disclosure are not necessarily symmetric for both good and bad 
news reports and can be asymmetric. In fact, recent empirical evidence suggests that 
information asymmetry is negatively associated with financial performance (Wittenberg-
Moerman 2008; Brown et al 2009; Ng et al. 2009; Rogers et al. 2009). 
Prior empirical studies typically focus on the disclosure of quantitative financial 
metrics, such as earnings guidance or segment accounting data, as opposed to more 
qualitative information (Patell 1976; Penman 1980; Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Lev and 
Penman 1990; Skinner 1994; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Harris 1998; Leuz 2004; Botosan 
and Stanford 2005; Berger and Hann 2007). One potential reason that qualitative 
disclosure receives less attention is that researchers incur higher costs to study it, 
particularly in large samples. Qualitative disclosure is not generally available in machine-
readable format and quantifying the information it contains is more difficult and less 
objective. However, developments in computing technology and the advancement of the 
SEC’s EDGAR database have reduced these costs.  
Recent empirical studies examine the textual characteristics (e.g., readability or 
tone) of qualitative disclosures provided in conjunction with firms’ mandatory 
disclosures and the economic consequences associated with this information. In general, 
these studies find that qualitative information is important and useful to market 
participants (Guo et al. 2004; Davis et al. 2008; Li 2008, 2010; Feldman et al. 2009; 
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Brown and Tucker 2010; Lehavy et al. 2010; Sun 2010). However, this research has only 
begun to examine the importance of qualitative disclosure, and does not provide a 
complete picture of when and why firms disclose different types of information.  
2.2 R&D-related Disclosure 
The R&D setting provides a particularly interesting area to study firms’ 
qualitative disclosure behavior in relation to reported performance. First, accounting rules 
treat R&D differently than other investments. While firms periodically evaluate the 
values of financial and physical assets through impairment, depreciation, or mark-to-
market procedures, firms must immediately expense R&D investments and there are few 
mandatory disclosure requirements.10 It is also very difficult to quantify accurately the 
future value of R&D investments. Consequently, financial statements fail to 
communicate effectively the value and performance of R&D investments (Lev 1999; Lev 
and Zarowin 1999; Aboody and Lev 2000).  
Second, R&D investment is associated with higher information asymmetry and 
uncertainty than more tangible investments. The unique and risky nature of R&D 
projects, the limited usefulness of information obtained from other firms, and the lack of 
well-developed markets for R&D-type assets reinforces the importance of R&D-related 
disclosure to investors (Aboody and Lev 2000; Boone and Raman 2001; Chan, 
Lakonishok, and Sougiannis 2001; Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone 2002).11 Moreover, 
R&D investment is economically important. Public corporations invest hundreds of 
                                                          
10 It is important to note that this generalization can depend on the presence of R&D arrangements. Current 
regulations require that firms disclose (1) the total R&D expenses for each income statement period 
presented (SFAS 2), (2) the amount of any in-process R&D acquired through acquisitions (SFAS 141 and 
142), and (3) the terms of any R&D arrangements accounted for as a contract to perform R&D for others 
(SFAS 68). 
11 In recent years, intellectual property auctions such as Ocean Tomo have started to appear; however, the 
recent economic downturn and a lack of broad interest have limited the liquidity and size of these groups.  
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billions of dollars annually in R&D projects to create valuable products, services, and 
processes (Wolfe 2010). A large literature across many disciplines examines R&D 
funding, performance, and valuation. R&D is of particular relevance to investors, because 
R&D investments affect performance, expected profits, and future cash flows (Grandi et 
al. 2009; see Lev 2001 for a synthesis of prior research). Thus, the combination of 
investors’ need for R&D-related information and the limitations of financial statements to 
convey it provides managers an important disclosure opportunity to inform investors 
about the fundamentals of their business activities. 
Despite the importance of R&D disclosure, prior research that directly examines 
firms’ communication of R&D information within the formal reporting context (i.e., 
within firms’ financial reports) is limited to a small number of studies based on limited 
samples and industries. Entwistle (1999) examines the R&D disclosure environment of 
113 technology-intensive firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.12 He performs 
both field interviews with executives and analysts, as well as a content analysis of the 
R&D-related disclosures in annual reports. His field interviews suggest that managers 
make cost/benefit analyses for their R&D-related disclosure decisions and that there is 
large variation across firms in the importance of capital and product market concerns. In 
addition, his content analysis suggests that R&D-related disclosure varies by industry and 
the amount of R&D spending.  
Similarly, Jones (2007) examines the amount of R&D information provided by 
firms using a sample of 119 U.S. firms in four R&D-related industries. She finds that 
R&D-related disclosure is associated with lower analyst forecast errors for both earnings 
                                                          
12 Note that the reporting requirements for Canadian firms differ from U.S. firms in that Canadian firms can 
choose to defer rather expense development costs (Entwhistle 1999). 
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and sales. Guo et al. (2004) focus on the competitive costs of disclosure by examining the 
product-related disclosures in the IPO prospectuses of 49 biotech companies. They find 
that the stage of product development, the availability of patent protection, and the 
presence of venture capital backing influence biotech firms’ R&D-related disclosures. 
They also find that the amount of R&D-related disclosure is negatively associated with 
measures of information asymmetry.  
While the generalizability of these studies is limited by their small samples and 
respective sample selection criteria, these studies suggest that managers can use their 
reporting discretion to provide important information about many different aspects of 
their R&D investments such as inputs (e.g., expenditure amounts, facilities, scientists, 
collaborations), progress of projects, outputs, and sources of funding. I extend prior 
research on R&D-related disclosure by examining the relation between disclosure and 
reported financial performance. In addition, I examine R&D-related disclosures using a 
large sample of firms across many different industries and base my tests on within-firm 
variation as well as changes in disclosure and performance.13 
2.3 R&D-related Disclosure and Financial Performance 
Motivated by theoretical models (Einhorn 2005; Bagnoli and Watts 2007), I study 
firms’ decisions to provide qualitative R&D-related disclosure in the framework of a 
performance evaluation. External stakeholders (e.g., investors, competitors, or suppliers) 
evaluate R&D firms’ reported current financial performance, relative to industry peers 
and prior period reports, to estimate firm value and to consider potential investment 
                                                          
13 Two concurrent working papers examine firms’ disclosure of R&D-related information outside of the 
firms’ formal financial reporting. James and Shaver (2009) examine the disclosures of 302 firms in the 
communications and pharmaceutical industries. Their evidence suggests that firms with stronger strategic 
positions are more likely to provide press releases regarding R&D accomplishments. Nichols (2009) 
examines the disclosure of product-related and business expansion announcements. His evidence suggests 
that these announcements trigger positive returns that are increasing in proprietary costs. 
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opportunities. Variation in reported performance relative to these benchmarks influences 
stakeholders’ demands for R&D information to complement the financial statements and 
influences firms’ willingness to supply this information.  
On the one hand, as current earnings performance decreases, reported earnings 
becomes less predictive of future performance, i.e., the earnings signal becomes noisier 
(Hayn 1995). This is particularly true for firms that invest in R&D as investors consider 
the causes and nature of lower performance with particular attention to R&D investments 
in forming expectations about firms’ long-term prospects (Joos and Plesko 2005). In fact, 
prior research suggests that the financial statements of poorly performing R&D firms are 
less useful to investors (Lev and Zarowin 1999; Franzen et al. 2007). In addition, while 
R&D investments are already associated with high information asymmetry, this 
information asymmetry increases as earnings performance decreases (Wittenberg-
Moerman 2008; Brown et al 2009; Ng et al. 2009; Rogers et al. 2009). Thus, as reported 
performance decreases the investors of firms that invest in R&D activities demand more 
information about those activities to better assess the amount and uncertainty of future 
cash flows and managers in turn are prompted to supply this information.14  
On the other hand, as earnings performance increases the predictive power of 
earnings increases and information asymmetry decreases. Better current financial 
performance suggests that prior R&D investments have been successful and alleviates 
some of investors’ concern about the amount and uncertainty of firms’ future cash flows. 
However, better performance also invites competition and influences the behavior of 
                                                          
14 For example, one pharmaceutical controller commented that his firm recently increased R&D disclosure 
significantly in an effort to obtain investment capital. This was because investors needed to understand the 
firm’s R&D in light of the firm’s recent poor performance. Similarly, several investor relations 
professionals from technology firms suggested that they provide additional R&D information when 
performance is down to keep investors on-board with their firms’ longer-term strategies.  
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competitors and suppliers who seek opportunities to increase their own performance 
(Dontoh 1989, Sadka 2004). The costs of disclosure (e.g., proprietary costs) could 
potentially increase with earnings performance because higher performing firms could 
have more to lose in terms of competitive advantage. Information asymmetry between 
management and competing firms about the cause of higher performance and its relation 
to the firm’s current R&D activities provides an important block to imitation and factor 
mobility (Lippman and Rumelt 1982, Barney 1991). Thus, providing less R&D-related 
disclosure when current performance is high could limit the ability of other firms to fully 
adjust important aspects of their operations such as pricing, production, research, 
advertising, or strategy. This suggests investors could demand less R&D-related 
disclosure when reported performance is higher and that managers could be less willingly 
to supply it. 15 Based on this analysis of both high and low performance, I propose the 
following hypothesis:16 
H1: Current earnings performance is negatively associated with the 
amount of firms’ R&D-related disclosure. 
  
My first hypothesis is consistent with the notion that as earnings performance 
decreases (increases), investors demand more (less) information to better evaluate their 
current or potential investments. However, there is likely considerable variation in the 
importance of this relation across firms. For example, this relation likely varies in the 
                                                          
15 While it not completely clear whether 10-K information benefits firms’ competitors, the author’s 
discussions with competitive intelligence experts and industry professionals suggest that many firms are 
very concerned about this problem in their 10-K disclosures and that competitors read this information. For 
example, in one 10-K filing Medivation, a pharmaceutical firm, indicated for the first time that it was 
expediting its stage three trials of an Alzheimer drug. Subsequent to this release, Elan and Wyeth, working 
in the same area, revealed that it would expedite the trials for its own Alzheimer drug. 
16 Note that this prediction is opposite to that of the literature on more quantitative disclosures (e.g., 
Verrecchia 1983).  The key issue is that qualitative and quantitative disclosures are different and serve 
different purposes. For example, I assume that qualitative R&D disclosure is used to “estimate the value 
implication of the content of firms’ financial reports” (Bagnoli and Watts 2007, 886) as opposed to 
providing a direct signal about firm value.   
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cross-section based on the relative importance of R&D investments and the amount of 
outside monitoring.  
My second hypothesis addresses how the relative importance of R&D investment 
to firms’ business strategies influences the relation between earnings performance and 
disclosure. On the one hand, as earnings performance decreases, R&D-related 
information is likely to be more important to investors in firms that place a greater 
emphasis on R&D. I specifically refer to these firms as having high R&D priorities. On 
the other hand, as earnings performance increases, R&D-related information could be 
more important to the competitors of firms with high R&D priorities (i.e., proprietary 
costs) to help them to adjust their own operations. My second hypothesis is as follows:   
H2: Current earnings performance is more negatively associated with the 
amount of firms’ R&D-related disclosure for firms with high R&D 
priorities as compared with firms with low R&D priorities. 
 
Finally, I examine how the relation between R&D-related disclosure and financial 
performance varies based on outside monitoring. Agency concerns increase as firm 
reported performance decreases because managers seek to withhold information that 
could reveal poor managerial action or ability (Nagar 1999; Bushee and Leuz 2005; 
Berger and Hann 2007). In the case of R&D, poorly performing firms could be hesitant to 
provide R&D-related disclosure because investors could conclude that management is 
making poor R&D investments or lacks competence. However, outside monitors such as 
institutional shareholders could pressure management to make decisions that are more 
aligned with shareholders’ interests (e.g., Bushee 1998). Thus, outside monitors can 
strengthen managements’ response to investors when reported performance is poor by 
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encouraging higher disclosure (Matsumoto et al. 2006). Based on this reasoning, I make 
the following hypothesis: 
H3:  Current earnings performance is more negatively associated with the 
amount of firms’ R&D-related disclosure for firms with high outside 
monitoring as compared with firms with low outside monitoring. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SAMPLE AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 My initial sample is based on firm/year observations for fiscal years 1996-2007 
with financial data available on the Compustat Fundamental Annual table and pricing 
data available from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). In addition, I 
require that each observation have at least one million dollars of assets, report non-zero 
R&D expense, and have 10-K data available from the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR). I link my sample observations to EDGAR 
filings based on the SEC’s Central Index Key (CIK). I drop firms without matches from 
the sample. Further, I require that each firm-year observation be a member of an industry 
with sufficient data to compute a measure of industry R&D payoff as well as to calculate 
my control variables. I provide specific details about these measures later in this section. 
My final sample is composed of 22,445 firm-year observations from firms that invest in 
R&D. 
3.2 Measuring R&D-related Disclosure 
I measure R&D-related disclosure based on a content analysis of 10-K filings. 
This measure has several advantages. First, it allows me to sample from a broad range of 
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industries and firms that make R&D investments. This is an improvement over prior 
empirical work on R&D-related disclosure that is limited to small samples and select 
industries. Second, this measure allows me to focus on qualitative disclosures that firms 
provide concurrently with accounting performance measures and reduces selection 
concerns because all firms with material R&D investments must provide a minimum 
level of disclosure in the 10-K filing. Third, prior research and private conversations with 
competitive intelligence professionals suggest that 10-K filings are an important source 
of information for market participants (e.g., Previts et al. 1994; Rogers and Grant 1997; 
Choudhary et al. 2010; Lehavy et al. 2010; Brown and Tucker 2010). It is important to 
note, however, that some firms’ 10-K filings have little within-firm variation (i.e., sticky 
disclosure) and can contain previously disclosed information (i.e., lack of timeliness).17   
To measure the R&D-related disclosure in 10-K filings I first develop an R&D 
disclosure dictionary of keywords and phrases after carefully examining by hand a 
random selection of over one hundred and fifty 10-K filings of firms included in my 
sample. In particular, I focus on keywords and phrases common across different firms’ 
disclosures. To ensure that my keywords list is reasonable I consulted industry personnel 
on R&D-related disclosure topics and compared my list with examples used in Entwistle 
                                                          
17 These drawbacks should work against my ability to find results. Another potential medium for R&D 
disclosure is firms’ press releases; however, collection of this data for a large sample of firms is very costly 
(e.g., data collection time and copyright/legal issues with data vendors). In addition, press releases can be 
subject to greater selection issues because firms are generally not obligated to issue R&D-related press 
releases, but are required to provide minimum R&D disclosures in the 10-K. I verify that my main results 
are similar in direction and significance in a reduced sample of firms using the number of R&D-related 
press releases as a measure of R&D disclosure. In addition, using a small hand-collected sample, I find that 
much of the specific information in firms’ R&D-related press releases is contained in 10-K filings, but that 
the two disclosures have some differential information. 
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(1999) and James and Shaver (2009). Appendix A contains the keywords that provide the 
basis for this dictionary approach to content analysis.18  
I use this list of keywords and phrases along with their common variants to 
identify R&D-related disclosures at the sentence level using a computerized algorithm. 
This algorithm uses the Perl programming language’s “regular expression” routines to 
search each 10-Ks for variations of the keywords and phrases found in Appendix A. 
Because it is difficult to construct measures based on subjective assessments of specific 
information items, I measure R&D-related disclosure (R&DDISC) as the number of R&D-
related sentences in firm’s 10-K filings.19 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of this 
measure. As shown in Panel A, the average firm discloses 30.87 R&D-related sentences. 
This number is likely higher than what would be anticipated if firms only disclose the 
minimum requirements.20 As a benchmark, I examine the number of earnings and 
revenue related disclosures. As expected, the average number of R&D-related disclosures 
is lower than that of these other disclosure areas. However, it is still a significant amount 
of R&D-related disclosure given critics’ contention that firms provide this information 
only for compliance purposes.   
                                                          
18 Because any list of keywords is subjective, it is important to note that my main results continue hold in 
both direction and significance when using only the bolded words in Appendix A to calculate R&D 
disclosure. The standard errors are slightly larger, however, consistent with the notion of greater 
measurement error or less precision.  
19 Using this procedure, I likely measure R&D disclosure with error. Because my disclosure measure is a 
dependent variable in this paper, it will not bias my estimates if the error is random, but it could lead to 
larger standard errors. It is difficult to objectively determine whether these errors are biased. If they are, it 
seems reasonable to argue that this bias is most likely associated with the levels of the independent 
variables (i.e., firm characteristics) and not with their changes. The levels are more likely to be related to 
differences in the structure (i.e., word choice and syntax) of the text of firms’ R&D-related disclosures.  
20 This assumes a strict interpretation of the rules and it is difficult to ascertain what the SEC would 
consider mandatory. For example, some firms receive comment letters from the SEC asking for additional 
R&D information. In general, firms respond to these requests by asserting that the information in question 
is proprietary and its disclosure would put the firm at a competitive disadvantage. 
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Panel B provides the descriptive statistics of firms’ R&D-related disclosure based 
on industries using the Fama-French 48 classification. Consistent with prior R&D studies 
(Entwistle 1999), pharmaceutical firms provide the greatest amount of R&D-related 
disclosure, averaging about 83 R&D-sentences per 10-K. Firms in industries that create 
high-tech/computer products (Medical Equipment, Business Services, Electronic 
Equipment, Measuring and Control Equipment, and Computers) provide about 24 to 30 
R&D-related sentences, on average. The remaining industries produce somewhat less 
R&D-related disclosure, averaging between 11 to 18 sentences.   
Panel C provides statistics of the percentage of a firm’s R&D-related disclosures 
that address specific R&D subjects. I assign a subject to an R&D-related disclosure if it 
contains words or phrases that relate to that particular subject. For example, an R&D-
related sentence from a pharmaceutical firm could discuss the progress of current 
projects. I also examine the sentences directly following an R&D-related disclosure to 
determine its subject because these sentences often explain or elaborate on the R&D-
related sentence. Appendix B provides examples of R&D-related disclosures pertaining 
to each subject category. I also examine whether R&D-related disclosure relates to risk 
(R&D Risk) or contains forward-looking statements (R&D FLS).21  
On average, 18% of firms’ R&D-related disclosure is related to explaining the 
risks and uncertainties associated with R&D investment. A large portion of R&D-related 
disclosure is about forward-looking information (17%, mostly risk-related), prior R&D 
                                                          
21 I define a sentence to be risk related if it contains the following phrases or common variations: “risk,” 
“uncertain,” “could significantly affect,” “may adversely affect,” “success depends,” “subject to,” 
“variability,” “fluctuations,” “may delay,” “cannot provide assurance,” and “no assurance.” I define a 
sentence to be forward-looking if it contains the future tense of words such as “will,” “could”, “should,” 
“expect,” “anticipate,” “plan,” “hope,” “believe,” “can,” “may,” “might,” “intend” “project,” “forecast,” 
“objective,” or “goal.” 
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expenditures (14%), competition (12%), facilities (12%), and strategy (11%). Firms 
provide less information, on average, about topics such as R&D progress (5%), 
employees (3%), and funding (2%). Overall, these data are consistent with firms 
providing important information to help alleviate information asymmetry concerns, 
however, areas associated with information that could be valuable to competitors, such as 
R&D progress, receive less discussion. 
3.3 Variable Definitions 
Performance 
I measure current earnings performance using an adjusted return-on-assets 
(adjROA), defined as annual operating earnings before R&D and advertising expense 
scaled by ending total assets, similar to Sougiannis (1994). I choose current earnings, in 
particular, because of the large body of evidence regarding its role as an important 
performance measure to investors and financial analysts. It is also important to managers 
either directly as a component of their compensation contract or indirectly through its 
relation to stock prices. In addition, earnings are a visible performance measure that 
receives considerable attention from investors and the financial press.22 
Control Variables 
 I control for firms’ information and disclosure environments, investment mix, 
information uncertainty, and financing incentives. Prior research suggests that firms with 
better information and disclosure environments (i.e., the amount and quality of 
information available to outsiders about the firm) provide higher levels of disclosure 
because these firms bear lower information production costs, have better information 
                                                          
22 My inferences continue to hold using other measures of performance including the market’s valuation of 
R&D investments, whether the firm met analysts’ expectations, and cash flow from operations. These are 
examined in Section 4.2. 
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systems, greater expertise, and better monitoring (Lang and Lundholm 1993). I employ a 
variety of proxies to capture this construct. I measure SIZE as the logarithm of total 
assets, ANALYSTS as the number of analysts following the firm at the beginning of the 
fiscal period, and %INST as the percentage of institutional ownership at the beginning of 
the fiscal period. All of these variables have been found to be positively associated with 
firm disclosure. In addition, I control for the overall quality of firm‘s disclosures with the 
number of management forecasts issued during the reporting period (MFCOUNT) (Nagar 
et al. 2003; Lehavy et al. 2011).23   
 I control for investment mix (intangibles vs. fixed assets), because the type of 
investment could influence the importance of capital and product market considerations 
to a firm. Entwistle (1999) finds that firms with higher R&D expenditures provide higher 
R&D-related disclosure. Similarly, I measure the extent of a R&D investment as the ratio 
of R&D expense to total operating expense (R&D/OPX). I also include the book-to-
market ratio (BM) as a measure of the extent of intangible assets; however, this variable 
could also capture aspects of proprietary cost. In addition, I include the capital intensity 
ratio (CAPINT) defined as the ratio of tangible assets (PP&E and inventories) to total 
assets. Firms with more tangible investments could have less incentive to provide R&D-
related disclosures because they have higher collateral in the form of physical assets. 
I also include controls for information uncertainty. Prior literature provides mixed 
evidence regarding the effect of information uncertainty on disclosure (Lang and 
Lundholm 1993). While investors prefer more disclosure when uncertainty is high, 
                                                          
23 Li (2008) provides evidence that firms with lower performance can obfuscate their performance by 
providing less readable disclosures. I do not control for readability in my reported results because of 
concerns that such measures are endogenous to the R&D disclosure decision. However, in untabulated 
results I find that my results are consistent (e.g., similar direction and significance) after the inclusion of 
measures of 10-K readability. 
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managers could be less able to provide accurate information and could have higher 
disclosure costs. I control for information uncertainty using the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over the reporting period (RETVOL) and the standard deviation of 
earnings over the prior 3 years. These measures capture information uncertainty relating 
to both general performance and to the uncertainty surrounding the payoffs to R&D 
investments.   
I include controls for financing incentives. Due to the uncertain nature of R&D 
investments, R&D performing firms rely on equity financing more than debt. Differences 
between debt and equity interests could create demands for different R&D-related 
disclosure information. Also, prior research suggests that firms could alter their 
disclosure behavior prior to issuing additional stock. As such, I include controls for 
leverage (LEVERAGE), measured as ratio of debt to total assets, and stock issuance 
(STOCK_ISS), measured as an indicator variable which equals one if the firm had a 
positive net equity issuance in the current year.24  
In addition to the controls described, I also include industry and year or firm and 
year fixed effects to control for unobserved constant factors that relate to both 
performance and R&D-related disclosure but are not accounted for in my other control 
variables. Industry-fixed effects are particularly important because it is likely that 
unobservable industry factors relate to both firms’ disclosure behavior and their 
performance. Similarly, firm-fixed effects are important because firms’ disclosure 
policies and their performance could be related to other unobservable characteristics and 
could confound my inferences.  
                                                          
24 Results are unchanged if I expand this variable to include the two future years as in Lang and Lundholm 
(1993), however, it does result in a smaller sample size and increases selection bias. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample of firm-year observations. 
Consistent with prior research, the distribution of the size of firms that invest in R&D 
measured by total sales and total assets is right skewed with means (medians) of $1,300 
(94) million and $1,400 (124) million, respectively. The average (median) adjusted 
return-on-assets is 0.06 (0.11). The average (median) firm in my sample is followed by 
4.4 (2) analysts and institutional investors own 38% (34%) of its outstanding shares. 
These averages are smaller than more general samples because a number of firms that 
invest in R&D tend to be smaller, less profitable firms. Importantly, the average (median) 
sample firm spends 17% (10%) of its operating budget on R&D (measured as the ratio of 
R&D expense to total operating expense), has a book-to-market ratio of 0.50 (0.37), and 
relies heavily on equity financing. The mean (median) debt-to-asset ratio (LEVERAGE) 
is only 17% (8%) and over 55% of sample firms had net stock issues during the fiscal 
year. 
4.2 Reported Performance and R&D-related Disclosure 
 My first hypothesis concerns whether reported earnings performance negatively 
influences firms’ decisions to provide concurrent R&D-related disclosure. To test this 
hypothesis I first examine the univariate correlation of current earnings performance with 
firms’ R&D-related disclosures. Panel A of Table 3 presents the Spearman and Pearson
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correlations of earnings (adjROA) with total R&D-related disclosures and also with the 
respective number of R&D-related disclosures on specific subjects.  
Consistent with my main hypothesis, I find that earnings performance correlates 
negatively with total R&D-related disclosure. However, I also find that it relates 
positively to the quantity of 10-K earnings and revenue disclosures, consistent with these 
disclosures have different characteristics than R&D-related information.  In addition, 
earnings performance is negatively related to almost all of the individual R&D subject 
disclosure measures. With few exceptions (e.g., R&D to Sales and In-process R&D), 
these correlations range from about -3% to -20%. In particular, earnings performance 
(adjROA) is more negatively associated with more firm specific disclosure issues such as 
R&D progress, patents, funding, and employees.  
To further examine the common variation in the various R&D-related disclosure 
subjects, I perform a factor analysis on these measures, rather than examining them 
individually in a multivariate setting. Consistent with the previous correlation results, 
standard diagnostic tests (e.g., eigenvalues, percentage of variation, and scree plots) 
suggest the presence of a single general factor. Panel B of Table 3 provides the 
coefficient estimates of the factor loadings and standardized factor scores. In particular, 
the higher factor loadings on R&D subjects that are important to investors, such as R&D 
projects, patents, competition, and collaborations, suggests that these disclosures share 
significant common variation (i.e., they move together). This is important because 
individual R&D subject disclosures do not capture the entirety of firms’ R&D-related 
disclosures and firms do not provide this information in isolation. Interestingly, I find that 
the factor produced by this analysis is highly correlated (p > .90) with the total number of 
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R&D sentences. Thus, in all subsequent multivariate tests, I use the number of R&D-
related sentences, rather than the factor, as my R&D-related disclosure measure for ease 
of interpretation. 
While the univariate results provide useful descriptive information, they do not 
control for a variety of important factors that could confound inferences regarding the 
relation of current earnings performance and R&D-related disclosure. Thus, I provide 
further evidence by estimating the following multivariate regression that includes 
controls for a variety of disclosure determinants examined in prior disclosure literature: 
LN(R&DDISC) = β0 + β1 adjROA + β2 SIZE + β3 ANALYSTS + β4 %INST +  
 β5 MFCOUNT + β6 R&D/OPX + β7 BM + β8 CAPINT +  
 β9 RETVOL + β10 EARNVOL + β11 LEVERAGE +  
 β12 STOCK_ISS + fixed effects + ε           (1). 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of R&DDISC.25 The estimation is 
performed using ordinary least squares regression. Column 1 reports the results of the 
estimation without fixed effects. t-statistics, presented in brackets, are based on standard 
errors that are clustered by firm and year. Consistent with my hypothesis, the coefficient 
on adjROA is -0.230 and is statistically significant (p < .01), suggesting that firms with 
lower earnings performance provide higher R&D-related disclosure.26  This implies that a 
                                                          
25 In my sample R&DDISC has a skewness of 2.8, thus I use the logarithmic transformation of R&DDISC to 
help alleviate this issue in the regressions which follow equation 2. 
26 I cluster on time and firm following Gow et al. (2010) who find that this procedure produces more 
reliable rejection rates than other methods even with as few as 10 time clusters. However, given concerns 
about the finite sample properties of this procedure I also verify that my results remain significant at p < .05 
based on bootstrap corrections (Cameron et al. 2008). In addition, the coefficient on adjROA continues to 
be negative and significant (p < 0.01) after the inclusion of time fixed effects in addition to industry fixed 
effects. I do not include time fixed effects because R&DPAYOFF is based only on time and industry variation. 
If I replace industry fixed effects with time fixed effects, the coefficient on R&DPAYOFF remains negative 
and significant at the 0.01 level. The same applies to the use of both firm and time fixed effects for both 
measures of performance and the inclusion of no fixed effects. In addition, the results remain significant at 
the p < 0.05 level regardless of the method of clustering.      
28 
 
standard deviation decrease in adjROA is associated with about a 5.5% increase in R&D-
related disclosure.  
The signs of the coefficients on the control variables are similar to those reported 
in prior disclosure literature. Firms with better information environments as measured by 
SIZE, %INST, and MFCOUNT provide more R&D-related disclosure (however, the 
coefficients on ANALYSTS is insignificant). I also find that firms with higher 
investment in innovation (as measured by R&D/OPX and MB) and lower amounts of 
fixed capital provide more R&D-related disclosure. Finally, less leveraged firms and 
firms with recent net stock issuances provide more R&D-related disclosure.  
While the evidence in column 1 suggests performance is negatively associated 
with R&D-related disclosure, it is possible that there are time invariant factors that have 
not been properly controlled for. To help mitigate this possibility, I estimate the previous 
regression model first with industry and year fixed effects and second with firm and year 
fixed effects. As shown in columns 2 and 3, the sign and significance of the coefficients 
on adjROA is largely unchanged. These results based on within-firm variation provide 
stronger evidence that firms provide R&D-related disclosure in response to the demands 
of investors based on current performance.27  
While my results based on within-firm variation support the prediction of a 
negative relation between R&D-related disclosure and performance, the firm-fixed effect 
approach assumes that the influence of current performance on firms’ R&D-related 
disclosure varies based on firm averages. In other words, the firm fixed effect results 
                                                          
27 I continue to find a negative and statistically significant relation (p < 0.05) when using alternative 
measures of performance such as the return from net income or cash flow from operations.  In addition, the 
sign and significance of my results are unchanged if I include additional controls for in-process R&D 
expenditures or general acquisition costs. Similarly, my inferences are unchanged if I limit the sample to 
firm-years with zero in-process R&D or firm-years without mergers and acquisitions. 
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address the question of how firms use R&D-related disclosure to respond to performance 
as it differs from their average performance. However, it is also important to consider 
how R&D-related disclosure varies as performance changes relative to prior year 
performance. In fact, the relation between changes in performance and changes in R&D-
related disclosure relates more strongly to idea that managers provide R&D-related 
disclosure in response to changes in performance. Thus, I estimate the following changes 
regression: 
ΔR&DDISC = β0 + β1 ΔadjROA + β2 ΔSIZE + β3 ΔANALYSTS + β4 Δ%INST +  
 β5 ΔMFCOUNT + β6 Δ(R&D/OPX) +β7 ΔCAPINT + β8 ΔRETVOL +  
 β9 ΔEARNVOL + β10 ΔLEVERAGE + β11 STOCK_ISS + year fixed 
effects + ε                           (2), 
 
where the dependent variable is the year-to-year change in R&DDISC and the independent 
variables are also year-to-year changes of those used in equation 1 with the exception of 
STOCK_ISS.28 I perform this estimation using ordinary least squares. t-statistics, 
presented in brackets, are based on standard errors that are clustered on firm and year.29 
Column 1 of Table 5 reports the results of the regression estimation. Consistent with my 
hypothesis and previous results, the coefficients on ΔadjROA is negative and significant.  
This result is particularly important because a large body of disclosure-based work 
focuses on cross-sectional regressions of levels variables where there are more severe 
                                                          
28 Note that the dependent variable does not incorporate the logarithmic transformation because the 
ΔR&DDISC does exhibit skewness. I do not use the change in STOCK_ISS because the issuance of stock is 
a represents a potential change in the firms’ capital structure. 
29 While the changes regression model differences out the levels effects of individual years, I continue to 
cluster my estimates by year to account for changes associated with effects common to individual years.  
My inferences do not change if I cluster only at the firm level or use bootstrapping techniques. In addition, 
the coefficient on ΔadjROA continues to be negative and significant after the inclusion of year fixed 
effects. However, similar to the previous regressions, I do not include year fixed effects because the 
ΔR&DPAYOFF measure is based only on time variation and the industry variation is differenced out in the 
changes. 
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concerns about correlated omitted variables. My evidence suggests that changes in 
earnings performance are negatively associated with changes in R&D-related disclosure.   
Next, I examine whether the results based on changes in earnings performance 
(adjROA, in Table 5 column 1) differ based on the sign of the earnings change to 
determine whether the relationship between R&D-related disclosure and earnings 
performance is different for samples with increasing or decreasing performance. Columns 
2 and 3 of Table 5 provide the estimation of equation 2 for samples of earnings increases 
and earnings decreases, separately. I find that the negative relation between changes in 
earnings performance and changes in R&D-related disclosure is significant for both 
samples. While the coefficient on adjROA is more negative for the sample of earnings 
decreases, I find no evidence that the relation is statistically different for earnings 
increases or decreases in a fully interacted model.  These results suggests that my 
findings are not driven solely by poorly performing firms that could provide R&D 
disclosures to downplay poor current performance.   
In addition, I also consider whether my results are robust to alternative measures 
of changes in performance. First, I construct a market-based measure of industry R&D 
payoff examined in Grandi, Hall, and Oriani (2009) that is well established in the 
economics literature.30 This measure estimates the payoff to R&D investment by 
examining how a firm’s R&D capital maps into Tobin’s Q based on an empirical model. 
                                                          
30 See Griliches 1981; Jaffe 1986; Cockburn and Griliches 1988; Hall 1993; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 
2005; Hall and Oriani 2006 for examples of this measure. While stock returns also provide a measure of 
market performance, they can be particularly noisy and long window returns may not relate well to firms’ 
disclosure choices at a particular moment in time. Consistent with this assertion, I find no evidence of an 
association between current annual returns and firms’ R&D disclosure. 
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To compute this measure I estimate the value of γ (R&DPAYOFF) in the following equation 
using nonlinear least squares for each industry and year:31 
𝐥𝐧 �𝑽𝒊,𝒕
𝑨𝒊,𝒕� = 𝐥𝐧 𝐛 + 𝐥𝐧(𝟏 + 𝛄𝑲𝒊,𝒕𝑨𝒊,𝒕 )                                                                           (3), 
where V is a firm’s market value three months after the fiscal period end, K is a firm’s 
tangible assets (PP&E and inventories), and A is a firm’s R&D capital based on the 
capitalization and amortization of R&D expenditures at a rate of 20% following Lev and 
Sougiannis (1996) and Chen, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001). The estimate of γ is 
interpreted as the differential valuation of R&D capital relative to tangible assets. 
I also examine how changes in cash flow from operations relate to changes in 
R&D disclosure as well as whether a firm’s reported earnings meet or beat the analyst 
consensus forecasts.  I measure changes in cash flow (ΔCF) as year-to-year changes in 
cash flow from operations scaled by total assets. I define ΔMeet or Beat as an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the firms’ earnings exceed the median analyst forecast prior to 
the earnings announcement following Livnat and Mendenall (2006) to adjust for stock 
splits.32  
The results of the estimation using these alternative measures of performance are 
presented in Table 6. Similar to the previous results, I find that changes in performance 
are negatively associated with changes in R&D disclosure using all three alternative 
measures. Overall, my evidence is consistent with the assertion that firms change their 
R&D-related information based on changes in reported performance. 
                                                          
31 See Grandi, Hall, and Oriani (2009) for specific details regarding the derivation of the empirical model. I 
require at least 20 observations for each industry-year regression. Note that I estimate the measure by 
industry-year because a firm specific measure would lack variation across time and this variation is 
important for identification purposes in my empirical tests. 
32 Note that the sample size for the regression using Δ Meet or Beat is smaller because it requires that the 
firm have analyst following. 
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4.3 Tests of Variation in the Relation between Reported Performance and R&D 
Disclosure 
 My second and third hypotheses suggest that the strength of the negative relation 
between changes in earnings performance and changes in R&D-related disclosure differs 
based on cross-sectional firm characteristics. The second hypothesis states that the 
negative relation between changes in current earnings performance and changes in R&D-
related disclosure is stronger for firms that place more importance on R&D investment, 
that is, high R&D priority firms. To identify firms with high R&D priorities, I partition 
my sample based on specific firm and industry characteristics. First, I measure the 
importance of a firm’s R&D based on the percentage of its operating budget spent on 
R&D investment. This measures how important R&D is as a component of a firms’ 
operating budget. Second, prior research suggests that firms in more concentrated 
industries face more intense competition and that innovation is increasingly important for 
firms facing more intense competition. Thus, I measure industry competition using the 
four-firm concentration ratios provided by the U.S. data based on three digit NAICS 
codes (Ali, Klasa, and Yeung 2008).  
I partition my sample firms into high and low R&D priority groups based on 
whether they are above or below the sample medians of both of these measures. I then 
estimate separate regressions for each group based on the changes regression model from 
equation 2. I present the estimation results for each group separately because the 
coefficient estimates of the groups likely differ considerably for both changes in 
performance and changes in the control variables. I determine the statistical significance 
of the coefficients across the two groups using a fully-interacted model. Table 7 reports 
the results from this analysis. Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that the relation 
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between changes in adjROA and changes in R&D-related disclosure is significantly more 
negative for the high R&D priority group.  In fact, a given change in adjROA for the high 
R&D priority group is associated with change in R&D-related disclosure that is more 
than three times greater than that of the low priority group. This evidence suggests that 
the importance of R&D to firms’ operations plays an important role in how firms provide 
R&D-related disclosure in response to reported performance. 
  My third hypothesis asserts that outside monitoring affects the relation between 
changes in earnings performance and changes in R&D-related disclosure by pressuring 
managers to disclose more when reported performance is lower. Specifically, I predict 
that the negative relation between changes in current earnings performance and changes 
in R&D-related disclosure is stronger for firms with higher outside monitoring. Using 
analyst following and the percentage of institutional ownership as measures of external 
monitoring (Bushee 1998), I partition my sample into high and low outside monitoring 
groups. I denote observations with above the median analyst following and institutional 
ownership as the high monitoring group and those below as the low monitoring group. I 
then estimate separate regressions for each group based on the changes regression model 
from equation 2.  
 Table 8 presents the results from this analysis.33 Consistent with my prediction, I 
find that the relation between changes in adjROA and changes in R&D-related disclosure 
is more negative for the high monitoring group. In particular, the influence of a change in 
adjROA on R&D-related disclosure for firms in the high outside monitoring group is just 
                                                          
33 The high and low groups for each table are based on two independent splits using a different set of 
variables for each table. Thus, the number of observations in Tables 6 and 7 are different.   
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less than double that of the low group. The significance of this difference is based on a 
fully interacted regression between the two groups.  
I perform additional cross-sectional tests by examining the sensitivity of the 
negative relation between current performance and R&D-related disclosure based on 
financing incentives. Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest that firms provide better 
disclosure prior to seasoned equity offerings. Thus, a negative relation between 
performance and R&D-related disclosure may be the result of poor performing firms 
seeking additional financing. I partition my sample into two groups based on whether a 
firm had a positive net stock issuance in the two years following the 10-K filing. While 
the relation between current earnings performance and R&D-related disclosure is more 
negative in the sample of firms without net stock issuances, this difference is not 
statistically significant. I also find similar results for partitions of my sample based on net 
debt issuance, negative cash flow from operations, and changes in total cash holdings. In 
the interest of brevity, I do not tabulate these results. 
4.4 Differences between Qualitative and Quantitative Disclosure 
 The primary results indicate that as earnings performance decreases, firms 
provide more R&D-related disclosure. In contrast, prior research suggests that firms with 
higher performance are more likely to provide quantitative disclosures such as annual 
earnings guidance to communicate performance to market participants (e.g., Patel 1976; 
Penman 1980; Waymire 1984; Lev and Penman 1990; Miller 2002; Houston, Lev, and 
Tucker 2010). However, qualitative and quantitative disclosures can serve different 
purposes and earnings performance could influence them differently. For example, 
quantitative disclosures such as earnings guidance directly inform investors about 
performance, while qualitative disclosures can help investors understand firms’ 
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fundamental operations. In addition, earnings performance can also relate to investors 
demand for different types of disclosure through its influence on the quality of managers’ 
information. In the case of earnings guidance, it is increasingly difficult for management 
to provide useful and accurate earnings projections as earnings performance decreases 
due to increased uncertainty (Chen et al. 2010). Thus, qualitative disclosure provides a 
useful disclosure alternative as earnings performance decreases to meet investors 
information demands. Specifically, I examine the relation between firms’ earnings 
performance and their decisions to provide future earnings guidance in my sample.  
Following prior research, I estimate a logistic regression based on the disclosure 
determinants previously explained for my sample of R&D performing firms. I also 
estimate this regression using OLS with firm and year fixed effects. Table 9 provides the 
results of this estimation. Consistent with prior research, I find that adjROA is positively 
associated with the likelihood that a firm provides earnings guidance in the coming year. 
Thus, while adjROA is negatively associated with R&D-related disclosures, it is 
positively associated with firms’ decisions to provide earnings guidance. This result is 
consistent with the notion that qualitative R&D-related disclosure and earnings guidance 
relate to performance differently. While some studies measure disclosure based solely on 
whether a firm provides earnings guidance, my results suggest that this approach likely 
over-generalizes disclosure policies to only the more quantitative aspects of disclosure 
and overlooks the significant amount of disclosure that is more qualitative in nature.  
4.5 Capital Market Consequences of 10-K R&D Disclosure 
 The primary results of this dissertation examine the role of performance as a 
determinant in firms’ R&D disclosure decisions under the assumption that R&D is 
valuable to investors and other stakeholders. In this section, I consider the capital market 
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consequences of firms’ 10-K R&D disclosures. Specifically, I consider the relation of 
R&D disclosure to the information content of 10-K filings measure through stock returns, 
future earnings, and relative bid-ask spreads. 
 I begin by examining how R&D disclosure relates to absolute market-adjusted 
stock returns as opposed to signed returns because it is not clear ex ante whether R&D 
disclosures contain on average good or bad news. I calculate the cumulative market 
adjusted stock return in the (-1,+1) event window centered on the 10-K filing date by 
summing the daily differences between the total return and the value-weighted market 
return. I then measure information content as the absolute value of this cumulative return. 
In particular, I am interested in whether the level and/or changes in R&D disclosure are 
associated with greater 10-K information content. Note that because it is not clear 
whether increase or decreases in R&D disclosure communicate good or bad news, I use 
the absolute value of R&D disclosure changes.  
In addition, I include controls for the absolute value of the cumulative market-
adjusted return centered on the earnings announcement (EAReturn) as well as the absolute 
level of adjusted earnings (adjROA) and absolute change in adjusted earnings 
(ΔadjROA). I include these variables for two reasons: 1) I expect the 10-K to contain 
greater information content when there is more news in earnings because it contains 
important details for investors to evaluate earnings information and 2) prior research on 
post earnings announcement drift suggests that prices do not fully impound all available 
information at the time of the earnings announcement (You and Zhang 2009). I also 
include the natural logarithm of a firm’s market capitalization (MC) and book-to-market 
ratio (B/M) at the end of the fiscal period as measures of firms’ information environment. 
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In addition, I also include the number of sentences in a firm’s 10-K (10-K Length), a 
comparison measure of disclosure as a control for other firm disclosures and also include 
year fixed effects. 
Table 10 provides the results. t-statistics are based on standard errors that 
clustered by both firm and year. The positive coefficient on Ln(R&DDISC) suggests that 
the 10-K filings of firms with greater levels of R&D disclosure contain greater 
information content. Similarly, the 10-Ks of firms with greater absolute changes in R&D 
disclosure are associated with greater information content. The coefficients on 
abs(EAReturn) and  abs(ΔadjROA) are positive and significant suggesting that 10-Ks 
contain greater information content when there is greater information in earnings. The 
coefficient on log(MC) is negative and significant which is consistent with the findings of 
prior literature that the disclosures of larger firms generally provide less new information 
to investors and that these firms have better information environments. It is also 
interesting to note that coefficient on 10-K Length is not significant and that of abs(Δ10-
K Length) is small and only marginally significant. This suggests that my measure of 10-
K R&D disclosure is different from measures of total 10-K disclosure or length.34     
 The preceding results suggests that 1) firms provide more R&D disclosure as 
performance decreases, 2) R&D disclosure contains information content. However, these 
results do not speak directly to the question of whether firms’ benefit from complying 
with investors demand for R&D disclosure. To address this issue I consider the relation 
between R&D disclosure and firms’ relative bid-ask spreads using both a levels and a 
                                                          
34 I also find similar results using the measures of the level and absolute changes of 10-K earnings and sales 
disclosures from Table 1 as controls. The coefficients on 10-K Sales disclosures are not significant in any 
of the results and that of 10-K earnings disclosures is negative, suggesting that 10-K with such disclosures 
contain less information content. 
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changes approach. First, I examine the relation between the level of R&D disclosure and 
the average daily level of firms’ relative bid-ask spread in the window (+2, +5) following 
the 10-K filing. I use the post event window to allow sufficient time for the market to 
process any information contained in the 10-K filing. I include the level of adjusted 
earnings, market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and length of 10-K as control 
variables.  Following Choudhary, Merkley, and Schloetzer (2011), I also include a 
measure of 10-K timeliness computed as the number of days that a firm makes its 10-K 
filing prior to the statutory deadline mandated by the SEC. Panel A of Table 11 presents 
the results. The coefficient on Ln(R&DDISC) is negative and significant suggesting that 
firms that provide higher R&D disclosure have lower bid-ask spreads.  However, because 
these results are likely associated with firm characteristics in the form of correlated 
omitted variables, I also consider a changes approach. 
Specifically, I examine the relation between year-to-year changes in R&D 
disclosure and the change in the average daily level of firms’ relative bid-ask spread 
calculated as the difference in this average in the post event window (+2, +5) and the pre 
event window (-49, -5).35 I include the market adjusted return from the 10-K event 
window to control for changes in other information contained in the 10-K filing. In 
addition, I include controls for changes in adjusted earnings, changes in 10-K length, and 
change in 10-K timeliness measured as previously explained. Panel B presents the results. 
Consistent with the levels results, I find that changes in R&D disclosure are negatively 
related to changes in bid-ask spreads. Consistent with Choudhary et al. (2011), I also find 
that changes in 10-K timeliness are negatively associated with bid-ask spreads. I do not, 
                                                          
35 This pre-event window is also used by Asthana et al. (2004) and Miller (2010) to measure trading 
abnormal trading volume. 
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however, find evidence that changes in 10-K length are associated with changes in bid-
ask spreads.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study emphasizes the role of qualitative disclosure as an important 
mechanism to help bridge the gap between more direct financial information, such as 
financial statements or earnings guidance, and the economic reality of firms’ operations 
(Glassman 2003). In particular, the results provide new empirical evidence on the relation 
between reported performance and qualitative disclosures in a specific setting – firms’ 
R&D-related disclosures. The R&D setting is provides a particularly informative research 
area because it emphasizes the importance of qualitative disclosure to external 
stakeholders, who need to evaluate the levels of risk and information asymmetry 
associated with the outcome of R&D investments. In addition, the limitations of financial 
statements to capture the value of R&D investments provide additional impetus to gain 
better insight into firms’ qualitative disclosure decisions.  
 I find that current earnings performance is negatively related to concurrent R&D-
related disclosure in both firm-fixed effect and changes regression analyses. I also find 
that this negative relation is a function of both the importance of R&D to the firm and the 
degree of outside monitoring. In contrast to my main results, I find that firms’ decisions 
to provide earnings guidance are positively related to current performance. These 
findings highlight the complexity of firms’ disclosure strategies and suggest that 
performance influences can influence the way firms’ disclosure different types of 
differently. While there are certainly limitations in the empirical measures and design
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common to this literature, my study provides important evidence regarding how 
managers use qualitative disclosure based on changes in performance to respond to 
investors.  
Additionally, this study provides relevant empirical evidence regarding the 
complimentary relation between mandatory disclosure (e.g., financial statements) and 
voluntary disclosure and builds on the predictions of prior disclosure theory (Hughes and 
Pae 2004; Einhorn 2005; Bagnoli and Watts 2007). Prior empirical evidence suggests that 
mandatory disclosure serves a confirmatory role and increases the credibility of voluntary 
disclosure (e.g., earnings guidance) because audited financial statements will 
subsequently be released (Beniluz 2004; Ball et al. 2010). This study examines a different 
complimentary relation, namely how the information in mandatory reports relates to 
firms’ decision to provide more or less qualitative disclosure. The results suggest that the 
importance of qualitative information as a complement to the financial statements 
depends on concurrently reported performance. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Information on R&D-related Disclosure 
 
This table provides descriptive information about the R&D-related disclosure measure calculated 
as the number of 10-K sentences that refer to R&D-related information. A sentence is determined 
to be R&D-related if it contains a keyword or related phrase from the dictionary of keywords 
found in Appendix A. Panel A provides statistics on the overall R&D-related disclosure measure 
and benchmarks it against a comparable score for earnings and revenue disclosures. Panel B 
provides descriptive information about R&D-related disclosure for selected industries. Industries 
are based on the Fama and French 48 classification. Panel C provides information regarding the 
average percentage of firms’ R&D-related sentences that address specific subjects. Subjects are 
identified by examining the words contained within each R&D-related sentence. Panel D 
provides R&D disclosure subject information by industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev
10-K R&D Disclosures 30.87 20 34.64
10-K Earnings Disclosures 51.77 42 34.07
10-K Revenue Disclosures 108.50 98 56.71
Industry N Mean Median Std Dev
Pharmaceutical Products 3,204 83.42 70.00 55.95
Medical Equipment 1,775 29.95 26.00 19.16
Business Services 3,691 27.83 24.00 23.38
Electronic Equipment 2,886 26.82 24.00 16.77
Measuring and Control Equipment 1,176 26.09 22.00 16.67
Computers 2,019 24.08 22.00 14.75
Chemicals 643 18.43 13.00 20.66
Electrical Equipment 446 16.66 10.00 17.51
Machinery 1,358 15.85 11.00 12.62
Other 4,753 13.96 10.00 13.71
Auto 494 11.89 9.00 11.08
Panel A. 10-K R&D-related Disclosures (N=22,445)
Panel B. 10-K R&D-related Disclosure by Industry
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TABLE 1 
(CONTINUED) 
Descriptive Information on R&D-related Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev
%R&D RISK 0.18 0.18 0.14
%R&D FLS 0.17 0.17 0.13
%R&D to Prior Periods 0.14 0.09 0.15
%R&D Competition 0.12 0.10 0.11
%R&D Facilities 0.12 0.09 0.12
%R&D Strategy 0.11 0.09 0.11
%R&D to Operations 0.07 0.04 0.08
%R&D to Sales 0.06 0.00 0.10
%R&D Collaboration 0.05 0.00 0.10
%In-process R&D 0.04 0.00 0.11
%Patents 0.05 0.01 0.07
%R&D Progress 0.05 0.00 0.09
%R&D Employees 0.03 0.00 0.06
%R&D Funding 0.02 0.00 0.04
%R&D Tax Credit 0.02 0.00 0.04
%Regulation 0.01 0.00 0.02
%R&D Market 0.00 0.00 0.01
Panel C. Subject of 10-K R&D-related Disclosures (N=22,445)
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TABLE 2 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the overall sample of 20,990 firm-year observations. 
The adjROA is defined as operating income before R&D and advertising expense scaled by 
ending total assets. ANALYSTS is the number of analysts following the firm at the fiscal period 
end. %INST is the percentage of institutional ownership at the fiscal period end. MFCOUNT is 
the number of management forecasts issued during the fiscal period. R&D/OPX is the ratio of 
R&D expense to total operating expense. BM is the ration of book value to market value at the 
end of the fiscal period. CAPINT is the ratio of PP&E and inventories to total assets. RETVOL is 
the standard deviation of monthly returns during the fiscal period. EARNVOL is the standard 
deviation of earnings over the past three years. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets. STOCK_ISS is an indicator variable coded to 1 if the firm had a positive net stock 
issuance during the fiscal period and zero otherwise. 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev
adjROA 0.06 0.11 0.24
Sales ($mil) 1,300 94 4,200
Total Assets ($mil) 1,400 124 4,600
ANALYSTS 4.40 2.00 6.03
%INST 0.38 0.34 0.32
MFCOUNT 1.49 0.00 2.72
R&D/OPX 0.17 0.10 0.21
BM 0.50 0.37 0.52
CAPINT 0.29 0.27 0.20
RETVOL 0.19 0.15 0.13
EARNVOL 0.15 0.06 0.24
LEVERAGE 0.17 0.08 0.23
STOCK_ISS 0.55 1.00 0.50
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TABLE 3 
R&D-related Disclosure Subjects and Reported Performance 
 
This table provides descriptive information about the role of the components of the R&D-related 
disclosure measure based on the subject matter of individual sentences. The subject matter is 
identified based on the inclusion of keywords or phrases in each sentence (see Appendix B for 
examples). Panel A provides Pearson and Spearman correlations for the association of adjROA 
with the total number of sentences for each subject area. Panel B provides the factor loading 
coefficients from a factor analysis of the common variation contained in the number of sentences 
provided in each subject area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Pearson Spearman
Overall Disclosures
Total 10-K R&D Disclosures -0.1214* -0.1234*
10-K Earnings Disclosures 0.2878* 0.3395*
10-K Revenue Disclosures 0.0741* 0.0660*
R&D Disclosure Categories
R&D to Prior Periods -0.0872* -0.1002*
R&D Competition -0.0974* -0.1010*
R&D Facilities -0.0548* -0.0629*
R&D Strategy -0.0827* -0.0982*
R&D to Operations -0.0458* -0.0532*
R&D to Sales 0.1476* 0.2028*
R&D Collaboration -0.0578* -0.1574*
In-process R&D 0.0697* 0.0851*
Patents -0.1675* -0.1968*
R&D Progress -0.1112* -0.1584*
R&D Employees -0.0552* -0.0755*
R&D Funding -0.1002* -0.1648*
R&D Tax Credit -0.0163* -0.0514*
Regulation -0.0927* -0.1334*
R&D Market -0.0281* -0.0342*
* indicates significance at the 0.05 level or lower.
Panel A. Univariate Correlation of Earnings Performance and R&D-related Disclosure 
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TABLE 3 
(CONTINUED) 
R&D-related Disclosure Subjects and Reported Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Factor Loading
Standardized 
Factor Score
R&D to Prior Periods 0.5873 0.0866
R&D Competition 0.7900 0.1604
R&D Facilities 0.6711 0.0945
R&D Strategy 0.7497 0.1167
R&D to Operations 0.6198 0.1012
R&D to Sales -0.0064 0.0114
R&D Collaboration 0.8019 0.1679
In-process R&D 0.1763 0.0238
Patents 0.7130 0.1070
R&D Progress 0.8355 0.2121
R&D Employees 0.3449 0.0428
R&D Funding 0.7194 0.1009
R&D Tax Credit 0.3181 0.0351
Regulation 0.5896 0.0591
R&D Market 0.2904 0.0233
Panel B. Factor Analysis of R&D-related Disclosure Subject Variables
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TABLE 4 
R&D-related Disclosure and Reported Performance 
 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of a regression of R&D-related disclosure on current 
performance. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the R&D-related disclosure score 
as defined in Table 1. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. All other variables are defined 
in Table 2. t-statistics (in brackets) are based on standard errors that are clustered as indicated in 
the table.   
 
Variable (1) (2) (3)
2.601*** 1.863*** 2.035***
[33.10] [26.55] [31.71]
-0.230*** -0.150*** -0.126***
[-3.23] [-3.17] [-4.85]
-0.009 0.033*** 0.130***
[-1.04] [4.26] [11.48]
0.006** 0.005** -0.002
[2.56] [2.48] [-0.99]
0.283*** 0.088* -0.039
[5.03] [1.90] [-1.12]
0.014** 0.005 -0.001
[2.42] [1.41] [-0.53]
2.621*** 1.960*** 0.596***
[33.67] [35.43] [11.16]
-0.094*** -0.059*** -0.004
[-4.01] [-2.76] [-0.47]
-0.781*** -0.496*** -0.009
[-11.46] [-7.82] [-0.14]
0.306** 0.549*** 0.090***
[2.23] [7.26] [3.12]
-0.050 0.025 0.079***
[-1.49] [0.90] [3.70]
-0.106** -0.087* 0.027
[-2.16] [-1.96] [1.25]
0.120*** 0.086*** 0.028***
[7.64] [6.36] [3.44]
Fixed Effects No Industry and Year Firm and Year
Standard Error Clustering Firm and Year Firm and Year Firm
Observations 22,445 22,445 22,445
Adjusted R-squared 49.6% 58.7% 88.5%
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Financing
Uncertainty
Investment Type
Information 
Environment
LEVERAGE
STOCK_ISS
BM
CAPINT
RETVOL
EARNVOL
MFCOUNT
R&D/OPX
%INST
Performance
Intercept
adjROA
SIZE
ANALYSTS
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TABLE 5 
Changes in R&D-related Disclosure and Changes in Reported Performance 
 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of a regression of year-to-year changes in R&D-
related disclosure on changes in current performance. The dependent variable is the year-to-year 
change in the R&D-related disclosure score. All other variables are defined as the current year-to-
year changes of the variables used in Table 4. t-statistics (in brackets) are based on standard 
errors that are clustered on firm and time. 
 
 
 
Variable All Firms ΔadjROA > 0 ΔadjROA < 0
-3.802*** -4.028*** 1.714***
[-19.93] [-15.12] [13.10]
-2.812*** -1.827** -3.511***
[-3.14] [-2.15] [-2.70]
2.992*** 3.274*** 2.774***
[9.46] [8.46] [5.56]
0.055 0.061 0.028
[0.98] [1.05] [0.44]
-0.554 -0.709 -0.383
[-0.66] [-0.84] [-0.31]
0.010 -0.016 0.046
[0.34] [-0.73] [0.80]
15.340*** 28.215*** 6.620**
[7.81] [9.12] [2.52]
2.912** 5.706*** 0.236
[2.08] [2.72] [0.17]
-0.237 -0.011 -0.449
[-0.23] [-0.01] [-0.60]
0.683 1.340* 0.251
[1.10] [1.79] [0.39]
0.971** 0.815 1.032***
[2.46] [0.92] [2.75]
0.107 0.040 0.128
[0.68] [0.17] [0.72]
Observations 19,284 9,402 9,882
Adjusted R-squared 2.7% 5.1% 1.8%
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Uncertainty ΔRETVOL
ΔEARNVOL
Financing ΔLEVERAGE
STOCK_ISS
Investment Type Δ(R&D/OPX)
ΔCAPINT
Intercept
Performance ΔadjROA
Information 
Environment
ΔSIZE
ΔANALYSTS
Δ%INST
ΔMFCOUNT
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TABLE 6 
Changes in R&D-related Disclosure and Alternative Measures  
of Changes in Performance  
 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of a regression of year-to-year changes in R&D-
related disclosure on changes in alternative measures of current performance. The dependent 
variable is the year-to-year change in the R&D-related disclosure score. ΔCF is the year-to-year 
change in cash flow from operations scaled by total assets. ΔMeet or Beat is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm’s earnings met or exceed the most recent consensus analyst earnings 
forecast prior to the earnings announcement. All variables are the same as in Table 5. t-statistics 
(in brackets) are based on standard errors that are clustered on firm and time. 
 
Variable (1) (2)
1.079*** -4.254*** 2.699***
[5.47] [-18.79] [12.05]
-0.234*
[-1.87]
-2.244***
[-2.89]
-0.538***
[-3.02]
2.485*** 3.116*** 3.384***
[8.95] [9.03] [5.94]
0.075 0.051 0.003
[1.31] [0.91] [0.05]
-0.547 -0.656 -1.323
[-0.56] [-0.78] [-1.24]
0.029 0.013 0.022
[0.91] [0.42] [0.65]
14.284*** 13.662*** 15.569***
[6.73] [6.05] [5.12]
3.147** 2.477* 3.543
[2.20] [1.75] [1.62]
-0.675 -0.127 -0.453
[-0.79] [-0.12] [-0.25]
0.912 0.921 2.042*
[1.53] [1.46] [1.85]
1.308*** 0.904** 0.657
[2.90] [2.21] [0.59]
0.167 0.108 0.013
[1.04] [0.67] [0.05]
Observations 18,773 19,276 10,485
Adjusted R-squared 2.2% 2.6% 2.6%
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
ΔMFCOUNT
Uncertainty ΔRETVOL
ΔEARNVOL
Financing ΔLEVERAGE
STOCK_ISS
ΔMeet or Beat
Investment Type Δ(R&D/OPX)
ΔCAPINT
Intercept
Performance ΔR&DPAYOFF
ΔCF
Information 
Environment
ΔSIZE
ΔANALYSTS
Δ%INST
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TABLE 7 
The Influence of R&D Priorities 
 
This table examines how the importance that firms’ place on R&D influences the relation 
between changes in performance and changes in R&D-related disclosure. The sample firms are 
partitioned into high and low R&D priority groups based on the median sample values of the ratio 
of R&D expenditures to operating expenses and industry four-firm concentration ratios. All 
variables are the same as in Table 5. t-statistics (in brackets) are based on standard errors that are 
clustered on firm and time. The statistical significance of the coefficients on changes in the 
measures of performance is determined by a fully-interacted regression. 
 
 
 
Variable High Low Difference
2.922*** 0.603***
[12.84] [6.85]
-4.692** -1.570** -3.122**
[-2.33] [-2.07] [-2.07]
4.331*** 2.321***
[6.43] [8.81]
0.055 -0.005
[0.27] [-0.10]
-1.579 -1.382**
[-0.91] [-2.10]
0.185 -0.022
[1.33] [-0.66]
16.192*** 20.714***
[6.12] [3.61]
6.320 -1.176
[1.47] [-0.81]
0.081 -0.167
[0.03] [-0.35]
2.052* 1.115
[1.85] [1.12]
1.599 0.084
[1.46] [0.16]
0.328 0.127
[0.68] [0.75]
Observations 3,939 4,234
Adjusted R-squared 3.3% 2.8%
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Investment Type Δ(R&D/OPX)
ΔCAPINT
Intercept
Performance ΔadjROA
R&D Priorities
Information 
Environment
ΔSIZE
ΔANALYSTS
Δ%INST
ΔMFCOUNT
Uncertainty ΔRETVOL
ΔEARNVOL
Financing ΔLEVERAGE
STOCK_ISS
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TABLE 8 
The Influence of Outside Monitoring 
 
This table examines how outside monitoring influences the relation between changes in 
performance and changes in R&D-related disclosure. The sample firms are partitioned into high 
and low monitoring groups based on the median sample values for analyst following and 
institutional ownership.  All variables are the same as in Table 5. t-statistics (in brackets) are 
based on standard errors that are clustered on firm and time. The statistical significance of the 
coefficients on changes in the measures of performance is determined by a fully-interacted 
regression. 
 
 
Variable High Low Difference
0.899*** -3.960***
[5.13] [-12.32]
-4.969*** -2.780*** -2.189**
[-3.18] [-3.15] [-2.20]
3.854*** 2.548***
[5.30] [6.44]
0.014 0.121
[0.23] [1.16]
-0.886 -0.842
[-0.89] [-0.32]
-0.012 -0.014
[-0.33] [-0.20]
21.103*** 12.747***
[9.14] [7.14]
4.892 2.126
[1.47] [1.39]
-2.425 -0.134
[-1.07] [-0.16]
0.973 0.479
[0.48] [0.78]
-0.002 0.939*
[-0.00] [1.73]
-0.159 0.377
[-0.62] [1.60]
Observations 8,010 7,932
Adjusted R-squared 3.0% 2.6%
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Outside Monitoring
Intercept
Performance ΔadjROA
Information 
Environment
ΔSIZE
ΔANALYSTS
Δ%INST
ΔMFCOUNT
Financing ΔLEVERAGE
STOCK_ISS
Investment Type Δ(R&D/OPX)
ΔCAPINT
Uncertainty ΔRETVOL
ΔEARNVOL
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TABLE 9 
Decision to Provide Earnings Guidance 
 
This table examines how performance influences the likelihood that a firm that invests in R&D 
will provide earnings guidance in the coming year. The estimates are obtained using both logistic 
and OLS regression models. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if the firm issues guidance and 
zero otherwise. All other variables are defined as in Table 4. 
 
 
Variable Logit Estimation OLS Estimation
-4.067*** -0.317***
[-14.10] [-5.46]
1.682*** 0.142***
[7.50] [5.36]
0.394*** 0.115***
[12.06] [10.68]
0.018** 0.009***
[2.21] [4.77]
1.238*** 0.112***
[7.97] [3.30]
-1.693*** -0.117***
[-5.68] [-2.60]
-0.138* -0.060***
[-1.70] [-5.17]
-0.240 0.041
[-0.92] [0.79]
0.382 -0.003
[1.13] [-0.08]
0.384*** 0.011
[3.18] [0.47]
-0.544*** -0.092***
[-3.36] [-3.47]
0.179*** -0.003
[3.08] [-0.37]
Fixed Effects Industry and Year Firm and Year
Standard Error Clustering Firm and Year Firm
Observations 18,132 18,144
Pseudo (Adjusted) R-squared 23.3% 58.2%
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Uncertainty RETVOL
EARNVOL
Financing LEVERAGE
STOCK_ISS
Information 
Environment
SIZE
ANALYSTS
%INST
Investment Type R&D/OPX
BM
CAPINT
Performance adjROA
Intercept
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TABLE 10 
Information Content of 10-K R&D Disclosures 
 
Panel A examines the relation between levels and changes in R&D disclosure and the absolute 
market-adjusted stock return to the 10-K filing in the window [-1, +1] centered on the 10-K filing 
date. Panel examines the relation between R&D disclosure and the signed market-adjusted 10-K 
return. Δ10-K Length is the year-over-year in the total number of sentences in a firm’s 10-K 
filing. EAReturn is the 3-day market adjusted return centered on the firm’s earnings announcement. 
MC is the firm’s market capitalization and MB is the firm’s market-to-book ratio at the end of the 
fiscal year. All other variables are defined as in Table 5. t-statistics (in brackets) are based on 
standard errors that are clustered on firm and time.  
 
 
 
Absolute 10-K Event Returns
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.0118*** -0.0129 0.0163*** 0.0164***
[7.41] [-1.47] [14.49] [14.83]
Ln(R&DDISC) 0.0054*** 0.0047***
[5.01] [4.72]
Ln(10-K Length) 0.0045***
[3.18]
abs(ΔR&DDISC) 0.0004*** 0.0003***
[4.42] [4.26]
abs(Δ10-K Length) 0.0000
[0.95]
abs(EAReturn) 0.0742*** 0.0736*** 0.0780*** 0.0780***
[5.51] [5.56] [5.64] [5.65]
abs(adjROA) 0.0060 0.0070 0.0050 0.0050
[0.70] [0.83] [0.58] [0.59]
abs(ΔadjROA) 0.0405*** 0.0383*** 0.0451*** 0.0449***
[6.25] [6.24] [6.42] [6.44]
Log(MC) -0.0047*** -0.0051*** -0.0048*** -0.0048***
[-12.55] [-16.04] [-12.56] [-13.19]
Log(B/M) -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0027 -0.0028
[-0.81] [-0.93] [-1.11] [-1.12]
Observations 16,351 16,351 16,351 16,351
Adjusted R-squared 16.4% 16.6% 15.8% 15.8%
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 11 
10-K R&D Disclosures and Relative Bid-Ask Spreads 
 
Panel A examines the relation between R&D disclosure and the average level of firms’ relative 
bid-ask spread following the 10-K filings (+2, +5). Panel B examines the relation between 
changes in R&D disclosure and the changes in the level of firms’ relative bid-ask spread caluclatd 
as the difference between the average relative spread in event window (+2, +5) less the average 
relative spread in event window (-49, -5). 10-K Length is the total number of sentences in a 
firm’s 10-K filing. MC is the firm’s market capitalization and MB is the firm’s market-to-book 
ratio at the end of the fiscal year. 10-K timeliness is the number of days that provides its 10-K 
filing prior to the statuatory deadline following Choudhary, Merkley, and Schloetzer (2011). t-
statistics (in brackets) are based on standard errors that are clustered on firm and time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A. Level of Relative Bid-Ask Spread 
Variables (1) (2)
Intercept 0.0834*** 0.1236***
[60.63] [11.07]
ln(R&DDISC) -0.0046*** -0.0061***
[-3.69] [-4.54]
adjROA -0.0186***
[-2.70]
ln(MC) -0.0149***
[-5.73]
ln(MB) -0.0013
[-1.10]
Ln(10-K Length) 0.0000
[1.61]
10-K Timeliness -0.0002
[-1.24]
Observations 13,012 13,012
Adjusted R-squared 4.8% 26.2%
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 11 
(CONTINUED) 
10-K R&D Disclosures and Relative Bid-Ask Spreads 
 
 
 
Panel B. Changes in Relative Bid-Ask Spreads
Variables (1) (2)
Intercept -0.0224*** -0.0074
[-318.14] [-0.84]
ΔR&DDISC -0.0001** -0.0001**
[-2.42] [-2.52]
ΔadjROA -0.0048
[-1.27]
10-K Return -0.0312***
[-4.33]
Δ10-K Length 0.0000
[1.32]
Δ10-K Timeliness -0.0001*
[-1.74]
Observations 13,418 13,418
Adjusted R-squared 0.4% 1.0%
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX A 
R&D-Related Disclosure Key Words 
 
This appendix provides the list of R&D-related keywords and phrases used to classify a 
sentence as an R&D-related disclosure. I developed the list through a careful review of 
over one hundred and fifty 10-K filings of firms included in my sample. To ensure that 
my keywords list is reasonable I consulted industry personnel on R&D-related disclosure 
topics and compared my list with examples used in Entwistle (1999) and James and 
Shaver (2009). In addition, the results of this study are similar when R&D-related 
disclosure is calculated using only the bolded key words. 
 
research and development 
R&D 
product development 
research, development 
research, engineering, and development 
research and product development 
research development 
research project 
research and evaluation project 
research program 
research collaboration 
research facility 
research facilities 
research initiative 
research venture 
research center 
conduct research 
new technology 
joint research 
develop technology 
entering development 
developing new products 
development of new products 
research operations 
research pipeline 
product engineering 
technology development 
technical development 
technology milestone 
technology breakthrough 
technological breakthrough 
breakthrough innovation 
clinical candidate 
product candidate 
drug candidate 
 
 
 
breakthrough in 
developing new technologies 
development of proprietary technology 
established a collaboration 
projects in development 
completion of key milestones 
continuing development of 
preclinical development 
preclinical data 
evaluating the potential of 
clinical data 
clinical development 
clinical program 
clinical study 
safety study 
pilot study 
announced a collaboration 
joint venture to develop 
collaborative initiative 
research collaboration 
collaborative research 
research collaborative 
new patent 
applied for patent 
claims in this patent 
filed patent 
granted a patent 
issued a patent 
new patent 
received a patent 
patent was awarded 
key patent 
important patent 
patents pending 
applications pending 
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APPENDIX B: 
Examples of R&D-Related Subject Disclosure 
 
 
R&D Progress 
 
We have initiated a clinical development plan which we believe 
will allow us to begin global Phase3 clinical studies in 
Alzheimers disease in 2008 and, if those studies are positive, to 
apply for U.S. and European marketing approval for Alzheimers 
disease in 2010. However, we caution you that these are forward-
looking statements, and as such are subject to significant risk and 
uncertainty. 
R&D 
Collaboration 
 
In February 1999, we entered into a four-antibody corporate 
collaboration with MedImmune. The agreement covers the 
licensing of Vitaxin to MedImmune as well as the optimization of 
three additional antibodies, including Synagis and an antibody 
against IL-9. Licenses granted under this agreement are exclusive 
and worldwide covering the right to research, develop, sell and 
sublicense. The business terms of the agreement includes research 
and development support, potential milestone payments, royalties 
on the sales of products resulting from the collaboration and an 
equity investment. The duration of the research and development 
aspect of this agreement has been extended through February 
2003. 
R&D Competition 
 
The Company intends to make further investments in people and 
equipment in subsequent years in order to increase new product 
development. The semiconductor industry is highly competitive 
and the Company expects competitive pressures to continue. The 
Company is in direct and active competition, as to one or more of 
its product families, with at least thirty manufacturers of such 
products, of varying financial size and strength.  
R&D Strategy 
 
This strategy is designed to align our product development 
initiatives with our manufacturing processes and manufacturing 
cost structure, and to reduce our exposure to more commodity-
type product applications that are prone to unpredictable demand 
and fluctuating pricing. Our focus is primarily on higher-margin 
products that possess design features that take optimal advantage 
of our existing and developing manufacturing technology and that 
command a price commensurate with the performance advantages 
of our alloys. In addition to our focus on products with higher 
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gross margins, we will continue to engage in prototype 
manufacturing, both for internally manufactured products and for 
products that will ultimately be licensed to or manufactured by 
third parties. 
Patents 
 
As of December 31, 2007, we had 95 granted patents in the 
United States from 58 families as well as 75 patent families with 
pending patent applications. We intend to file additional patent 
applications when appropriate, and to aggressively prosecute, 
enforce, and defend our patents and other proprietary technology.  
R&D Funding 
 
In August 2003, we signed a new $3.0 million research and 
development contract with the U.S. Army for the development of 
KEPs, which was later supplemented by additional $2.7 million. 
Our strategy is to orient the KEP program toward future systems 
such as the Joint Strike Fighter program and the Armys Future 
Combat System. We also continue to work with a number of 
defense-related research and development agencies and large 
defense companies to identify additional military applications that 
may benefit from using Liquidmetal alloys.  
R&D to 
Operations 
 
Our losses have resulted principally from expenses incurred in 
research and development of our technology and products and 
from selling, general and administrative expenses that we have 
incurred while building our business infrastructure. We expect to 
continue to incur significant operating losses in the future as we 
continue our research and development efforts and seek to obtain 
regulatory approval of our products. Our ability to achieve 
profitability depends on our ability to raise additional capital, 
complete development of our products, obtain regulatory 
approvals and market our products.  
R&D Facilities 
 
The Company's business units maintain product development and 
engineering departments whose activities are focused on 
improving existing products and services and developing new 
technologies to meet customer demands for improved drilling 
performance and environmental-based solutions for drilling and 
completion operations. The Company's primary research facilities 
are located in Houston, Texas; Stavanger, Norway; and 
Aberdeen, Scotland. The Company also maintains a drill bit 
database which records the performance of substantially all drill 
bits used in the United States over the last 16 years, including 
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those manufactured by competitors. 
R&D to Prior 
Periods 
 
Research and development expenses in fiscal 2004 decreased 
$0.7 million to $14.6 million from $15.3 million in fiscal 2003 
due to our reduced silicon development efforts in 2004. Research 
and development expenses in fiscal 2003 decreased $0.1 million 
to $15.3 million from $15.4 million. In fiscal 2002 research and 
development expenditures were constant due to managements 
dedication to the development of new and enhanced products, 
such as the next generation quartz automotive gyro sensor, 
NCAPS torque sensors and improvements to other existing 
product families.  
Regulation 
 
Governmental and regulatory authorities may approve a product 
candidate for fewer indications or narrower circumstances than 
requested or may condition approval on the performance of post-
marketing studies for a product candidate. Even if a product 
receives regulatory approval and clearance, it may later exhibit 
adverse side effects that limit or prevent its widespread use or that 
force us to withdraw the product from the market. Any marketed 
product and its manufacturer will continue to be subject to strict 
regulation after approval.  
R&D Employees 
 
The Company employs approximately 18 people in its research 
and development department, including seven PhDs with 
specialties in the fields of molecular biology, protein chemistry, 
vascular physiology, and biochemistry. 
R&D Tax Credit 
 
We also have research and development tax credit carry forwards 
of approximately $1.9 million that begin to expire in 2005, if not 
previously utilized. Utilization of our net operating loss carry 
forwards will be subject to limitations due to the change in 
ownership provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1996, as 
amended, as a result of our prior issuances of equity securities. 
These carry forwards, therefore, may expire prior to being fully 
utilized.  
In-process R&D 
 
The acquired in-process research and development projects are in 
various stages of development, had not reached technological 
feasibility at the time of acquisition and had no known alternative 
uses. The efforts required to develop the acquired in-process 
research and development into commercially viable products 
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include completion of the development stages of the 
commercially viable products, clinical-trial testing, FDA approval 
and commercialization. Due to the nature of the pharmaceutical 
development process, the Company anticipates incurring 
additional costs to develop these products.  
R&D Market 
 
In response to this rapidly growing market, handset original 
equipment manufacturers, or OEMs, are significantly shortening 
product development cycles, seeking simplified architectures and 
streamlining manufacturing processes. Traditional OEMs are 
shifting to low-cost suppliers around the world. In turn, original 
design manufacturers, or ODMs, and contract manufacturers, 
who lack RF and systems-level expertise, are entering the high-
volume mobile phone market to support OEMs as well as to 
develop handset platforms of their own.  
R&D to Sales 
 
Net product development expenses as a percentage of revenues 
were 4.3%, 8.6% and 8.0% in 1996, 1995 and 1994, respectively. 
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APPENDIX C: 
Additional Results Using R&D Press Release Counts 
 
This appendix provides additional results on the relation between current performance 
and R&D disclosure using R&D-related press releases as a measure of disclosure. In the 
first two columns the dependent variable is natural logarithm of the number of R&D 
related press releases issues during the fiscal year and the analysis is conducted using 
ordinary least squares regression. In the second two columns the analysis is conducted 
based on a logit model and the dependent variable is coded 1 if the firm issued at least 
one R&D-related press release and is zero otherwise.  An article is identified as an R&D-
related press release if it contains the bolded words from Appendix A. The analysis is 
conducted on a subsample of firms with high levels of R&D expenditures relative to sales 
and operating expenses. All results include industry fixed effects. 
 
Variable
-0.9817*** -0.9107*** -2.3031** -2.1911**
[-6.07] [-5.41] [-2.29] [-2.14]
-0.2488* -0.5044**
[-1.67] [-2.10]
-0.0218 -0.0355
[-1.24] [-1.04]
0.1713*** 0.1715*** 0.2847*** 0.2847***
[8.22] [8.24] [7.72] [7.75]
0.0117** 0.0112** 0.0152* 0.0142*
[2.20] [2.04] [1.85] [1.74]
-0.1332 -0.1428 0.0699 0.0502
[-1.20] [-1.30] [0.44] [0.32]
0.0211* 0.0206* 0.0346** 0.0336**
[1.80] [1.74] [2.55] [2.47]
0.8048*** 0.7757*** 2.0511*** 1.9774***
[5.15] [5.15] [4.66] [4.55]
0.0097*** 0.0086*** 0.0140* 0.0116
[3.37] [2.91] [1.96] [1.64]
-0.0073 -0.0237 -0.1323 -0.1635
[-0.05] [-0.16] [-0.49] [-0.61]
-0.1086 -0.0218 0.3201 0.4749
[-0.62] [-0.12] [1.07] [1.58]
0.0246 0.0831 0.0402 0.1657
[0.32] [0.91] [0.18] [0.76]
-0.3134*** -0.2715** -0.7167*** -0.6309**
[-2.62] [-2.38] [-2.73] [-2.43]
-0.0220 -0.0212 0.0118 0.0127
[-0.79] [-0.76] [0.19] [0.20]
Standard Error Clustering Firm and Year Firm and Year Firm Firm
Observations 7,032 7,032 7,022 7,022
Adjusted (Pseudo) R-squared 23.9% 23.8% 9.7% 9.7%
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Log(1+#R&DNEWS) R&DNEWS > 0
Uncertainty RETVOL
EARNVOL
Financing LEVERAGE
STOCK_ISS
Investment 
Type
R&D/OPX
MB
CAPINT
Intercept
R&DPAYOFF
Performance adjROA
Information 
Environment
SIZE
ANALYSTS
%INST
MFCOUNT
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